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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Petitioner/ : 
Cross-Respondent, 
v. 
RICKIE L. REBER, : 
TEX WILLIAM ATKINS, & 
STEVEN PAUL THUNEHORST, : 
Respondents/ : 
Cross-Petitioners. Case No. 20060299-SC 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
in the interest of: 
C.R., 
A person under 18 years of age. 
REPLY BRIEF OF PETITIONER AND 
RESPONSE TO BRIEF OF CROSS-PETITIONER 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON CERTIORARI REVIEW 
This Court granted the State's petition for certiorari to 
review two specific issues raised by the court of appeals' 
opinions in State v. Reber, 2005 UT App 485, 128 P.3d 1211, and 
In re C.R., 2005 Ut App 486 (unpublished). See Opening Br. of 
Pet. at addenda A and B. These issues are: 
(1) whether the Ute Indian Tribe has a regulatory interest 
in hunting throughout Indian Country, such that the Tribe is a 
crime victim of any illegal hunting within Indian Country in 
Uintah County; and 
(2) whether the Ute Indian Tribe has a property interest in 
wildlife located throughout Indian Country, such that the Tribe 
is a crime victim of any illegal hunting within Indian Country in 
Uintah County. 
The Court also granted defendant's cross-petition for 
certiorari to review a third issue, referenced by the court of 
appeals as part of a historical fact recitation. See Reber, 2005 
UT App 485, 58. This is: 
(3) whether the Uintah Band exists independently of the Ute 
Indian Tribe such that it retains treaty rights to hunt and fish 
in Indian Country and, if so, whether defendant has demonstrated 
membership in that band. 
These are the only three issues certified for review. See 
Order, Opening Br. of Pet. at addendum D. Defendant now seeks to 
bootstrap other issues related to due process, infancy, mistake 
of law, and judicial bias into the grant of certiorari. See Br. 
of Resp. at 17-24. This attempt is improper for two reasons. 
First, these issues are beyond the scope of the Court's order 
granting certiorari. See Order, Opening Br. of Pet. at addendum 
D. And second, the court of appeals did not rule on these 
issues. .See Butterfield v. Okubo, 831 P.2d 97, 101 n.2 (Utah 
1992)(on certiorari review, this Court reviews the decision of 
the court of appeals). Certiorari review is intended to provide 
this Court with an opportunity to reconsider select matters of 
law decided by the court of appeals; it is not intended to 
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provide defendant with a second de novo appeal of issues 
previously raised but not ruled upon. Id. (citing Utah R. App. 
P. 46). For these reasons, the State will not respond to pages 
17 through 24 of defendant's brief. Should the Court choose to 
address these issues, however, the State requests the opportunity 
for supplemental briefing. See State v. Robison, 2006 UT 65, 525 
n. 5. 
POINT ONE 
DEFENDANT'S RELIANCE ON UTE V IS 
MISPLACED BECAUSE UTE V DOES NOT 
EQUATE INDIAN COUNTRY WITH TRUST 
LAND, BECAUSE IT APPLIES ONLY TO A 
GEOGRAPHICAL AREA NOT AT ISSUE 
HERE, AND BECAUSE IT DOES NOT 
ANSWER THE JURISDICTIONAL QUESTION 
POSED BY THIS CASE 
Defendant agrees with the court of appeals' conclusion that 
the State lacked jurisdiction over his illegal hunting in Indian 
Country. Defendant's reasoning, however, departs from that of 
the court of appeals. Relying on Ute Indian Tribe v. Utah, 114 
F.3d 1513 (10th Cir. 1997) ("Ute V"), defendant contends that "the 
alleged offenses took place on tribal trust lands as defined by 
Ute V, and [. . . ] , pursuant to Ute V, they are subject to 
exclusive tribal and federal jurisdiction." Br. of Resp. at 10. 
In his view, "[a]ny discussion of jurisdiction over Indian lands 
on the Uintah and Ouray Reservation begins and ends with Ute V." 
Id. Defendant's reliance is misplaced.1 
1
 The court of appeals also cited to Ute V, using the case 
to support its conclusion that "the original Uncompahgre 
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A. Ute V does not equate "trust" or "tribal" lands with all of 
Indian Country, as defendant asserts. 
Defendant contends that Ute V stands for the proposition 
that all land within the Uintah and Ouray reservation is trust 
land and, therefore, beyond the ambit of state jurisdiction. See 
Br. of Resp. at 11. This argument fails because it misconstrues 
Ute V and is incorrect as a matter of law. 
Defendant reaches his novel conclusion that virtually all of 
Indian Country is trust land by ignoring all land ownership 
distinctions within Indian Country. Indian Country, however, 
refers to geographical boundaries; trust land describes one of 
many forms of ownership to which land within Indian Country may 
be subject. See, e.g., State v. Perank, 858 P.2d 927, 934 n.9 
(Utah 1992) ("section 1151 defines Indian Country to include all 
land within a reservation"); Handbook of Federal Indian Law 
188-96 (2005 ed.). Only by dismissing the reality that different 
entities can and do own property located within Indian Country 
can defendant conclude that trust lands are coextensive with 
Indian Country. See Opening Br. of Pet. at 10-12 (explaining 
distinctions in land ownership). 
reservation is . . . Indian Country, which falls under the Ute 
Tribe's . . . criminal jurisdiction." Reber, 2005 UT App 485, 19 
(citing Ute V, 114 F.3d at 1530). The first part of the court's 
conclusion — that the Uncompahgre is Indian Country — is correct. 
The second part, however, is correct only insofar as defendant or 
the victim, if any, is Indian. Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463, 
465 n.2 (1984). 
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Moreover, defendant's argument turns the language of Ute V 
on its head. Ute V expressly recognizes that trust land is only 
one of several categories of land ownership within the geographic 
boundaries of Indian Country: 
[W]e reject the argument that Indian country 
is confined to lands held in trust by the 
federal government under § 1151(c). [2] 
Rather, Indian country extends to all trust 
lands, the National Forest Lands, [and] the 
Uncompahgre Reservation. . . 
Ute V, 114 F.3d at 1530-31; see also Ute III, 773 F.2d 1087, 
1099-1100 (10th Cir. 1985)(Seymour, J., concurring) ("National 
forest land that is on an Indian reservation is similar to land 
that is privately held within a reservation; it is not l^and 
belonging to the Tribe or held in trust by the United States in 
trust for the Tribe'" (citing Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 
544, 557 (1981)). The very cases on which defendant relies, 
then, explicitly recognize that Indian Country encompasses not 
only lands held in trust for an Indian or Indian tribe but also 
many other kinds of land that are not held in trust.3 
2
 Section 1151(c) statutorily defines "Indian Country" and 
is found at 18 U.S.C. §1151. See Opening Br. of Pet. at addendum 
E. 
3
 Indeed, multiple forms of ownership can be found within 
most Indian Country: state-owned land, federal public lands, 
lands owned by Indians or non-Indians in fee simple, even towns 
incorporated by non-Indians under state law. See William C. 
Canby, Jr., American Indian Law 126 (4th ed. 2004). Under 
defendant's interpretation, however, state-owned lands would be 
trust lands, held in trust by the federal government for an 
individual Indian or Indian tribe. The State would thus have no 
jurisdiction, even over crimes committed on land that it owned. 
Such an interpretation plainly defies reason. Similarly, if the 
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B. Ute Vf by its plain and explicit language, applies only to 
the Uintah Valley reservation 
Defendant's claim that Ute V controls the jurisdictional 
determination in this case also fails because Ute V addressed 
only which lands within the Uintah Valley reservation were no 
longer Indian Country. See Ute V, 114 F.3d at 1529 ("In 
particular, we must decide which lands within the Uintah Valley 
Reservation are no longer Indian Country after Hacren Tv. Utah, 
510 U.S. 399 (1994)]"). Here, all parties agreed that the crimes 
were committed in Indian Country. 
As a general matter, the Uintah Valley reservation, 
established in 1861, forms the northern section of what is today 
the Uintah and Ouray reservation. The Uncompahgre reservation, 
established in 1882, forms the southern section of what is today 
the Uintah and Ouray reservation. See Reber, 2005 UT App. 485, 
118 (quoting United States v. Von Murdock, 132 F.3d 534, 540 (10th 
Cir. 1997)). Ute V addresses the northern section only. It is 
undisputed that defendant committed his crime in the southern 
section.4 Ute V, therefore, does not advance defendant's case. 
National Forest land on which defendants Thunehorst and Atkins 
committed their crimes was trust land, then the National Forest 
would be held in trust by the federal government only for the Ute 
Indian Tribe. It could not simultaneously be public land owned 
by the federal government for the use and enjoyment of all 
people. 
4
 Defendants Thunehorst and Atkins stipulated in the trial 
court that rulings made with respect to jurisdiction and Indian 
status in defendant Reber's case would also be binding on them. 
See Thunehorst R. 114; Atkins R. 112, 114. 
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The context in which Ute V arose demonstrates more 
specifically why defendant's reliance on it is misplaced. Ute V 
culminated sixteen years of litigation over the extent to which 
the Uintah Valley reservation boundaries had been diminished, 
rendering certain lands no longer within Indian Country. Ute V 
arose just after the United States Supreme Court decided Hagen v. 
Utah, 510 U.S. 399 (1994), which resolved a conflict between a 
decision of the Tenth Circuit, Ute Indian Tribe v. State of Utah, 
773 F.2d 1087 (10th Cir. 1985) ("Ute III") , and several decisions 
of the Utah Supreme Court, State v. Hagen, 858 P.2d 925 (Utah 
1992); State v. Coando, 858 P.2d 926 (Utah 1992)(issued on same 
day as Hagen); and State v. Perank, 858 P.2d 927 (Utah 
1992)(same).5 
After the United States Supreme Court issued Hagen, the 
Tenth Circuit in Ute V revisited and modified Ute III. In 
reconciling Ute III with Hagen, Ute V specifically acknowledged 
that Hagen dealt only with the diminishment of the boundaries of 
Indian Country with respect to the Uintah Valley reservation. 
5
 The Tenth Circuit in Ute III held, among other things, 
that the Uintah Valley reservation had not been diminished by 
1902-05 federal allotment legislation. Ute III, 773 F.2d at 
1093. In contrast, the Utah Supreme Court in Hagen, Perank, and 
Coando held that the Uintah Valley reservation had been 
diminished. See Hagen, 858 P.2d at 926; Perank, 858 P.2d at 952-
53; Coando, 858 P.2d at 927. The United States Supreme Court 
resolved the conflict in Hagen, agreeing with this Court that the 
reservation had been diminished. Hagen, 510 U.S. at 421-22. 
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Ute V, 114 F.3d at 1528. Ute V clearly acknowledges that Haaen 
did not affect the Indian Country status of the National Forest 
lands or the Uncompahgre reservation. Id. Accordingly, 
consistent with Hagen, Ute V did not change the status of either 
the National Forest lands in the northern section or the 
Uncompahgre reservation in the southern section, both of which 
remained Indian Country. 
Because Ute V explicitly does not apply to the National 
Forest lands or the Uncompahgre reservation, it does not speak to 
the land on which defendants committed their crimes.6 And even 
assuming arguendo that it did apply, it would simply stand for 
the proposition on which the parties and the court all agree, 
that the land on which defendants committed their crimes is 
Indian Country (R. 29, 263-64, 321, 364-65). 
Moreover, as far back as Ute I, federal courts have 
recognized that the demarcation of boundaries between Indian 
Country and non-Indian Country is only the starting point for 
determining jurisdiction. See Ute Indian Tribe v. State of Utah, 
521 F.Supp. 1072, 1156-57 (D. Utah 1981){"Ute I") (noting that 
reservation boundary determinations simplify the jurisdictional 
inquiry but that ultimate dispute resolution relies on 
6
 Defendants Thunehorst and Atkins hunted unlawfully on 
National Forest lands (R. 363-64). Defendant Reber and his son 
committed their crimes "just east of Bitter Creek on the Kings 
Well Road" in Uintah County, on the Uncompahgre (R. 584: 164; R. 
68, 364; R. 50 (map reproduced in Opening Br. of Pet. at 
addendum F). 
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application of "evolving principles of federal Indian law and 
jurisdiction"). Ute V simply provides no guidance for the 
jurisdictional question in this case: who has jurisdiction when a 
non-Indian commits a crime in Indian Country on land that is 
neither owned by the Tribe nor held in trust for the Tribe? See 
Ute Indian Tribe v. State of Utah, 935 F.Supp. 1473, 1492 (D. 
Utah 1996) ("Ute IV") ("Defendants' simplistic 'Indian Country-
equals-trust lands' equation cannot accurately define the 
jurisdictional landscape of the Uintah Reservation even as 
diminished.") The specific inquiry posed by this case must be 
guided by the settled principles of federal Indian law.7 
C. Montana v. United States answers the jurisdictional question 
posed by this case. 
Like defendant, the court of appeals adopted the "simplistic 
^Indian Country-equals-trust lands' equation." Id. It thus 
missed the crucial distinction between Indian Country as a 
geographical descriptor and the many different kinds of land 
ownership that may occur within its boundaries. See Reber, 2005 
7
 In this case, where the parties agree that the crimes 
were committed in Indian Country, the inquiry proceeds directly 
to the next step, determining whether either the defendant or the 
victim, if there is one, is Indian. See Canby at 180-81. 
(Opening Br. of Pet. at addendum G). If defendant is not Indian 
and the victim, if any, is not Indian, then the State has 
jurisdiction. Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463, 465 n.2 (1984) 
("Within Indian Country, state jurisdiction is limited to crimes 
by non-Indians against non-Indians . . . and victimless crimes by 
non-Indians"). The State's exercise of jurisdiction under these 
limited circumstances is thus an exception to the general rule 
that either the Tribe or the federal government has jurisdiction 
over crimes committed in Indian Country. See Cohen's Handbook of 
Federal Indian Law 1149-54 (2005 ed.). 
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UT App 485, 57. By so doing, the court failed to recognize that 
while the Tribe can regulate all hunting on trust or tribal land, 
it cannot regulate non-Indian hunting on non-trust land, even 
though both kinds of land are located within Indian Country. 
Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 564-66 (1981); see also 
South Dakota v. Bourland, 508 U.S. 679, 692 (1993)(holding that 
Montana's limitation on tribal authority over non-Indian hunting 
and fishing on non-Indian land in Indian Country applies to 
public land held by the Federal government). Missing this 
distinction within Indian Country between trust land and non-
trust land, the court of appeals ran directly afoul of Montana's 
holding that tribal jurisdiction does not extend to non-Indians 
who hunt and fish on non-Indian-owned and non-trust lands.8 Id. 
Because under federal law the Ute Tribe has no regulatory 
authority over non-Indians who unlawfully hunt within these 
areas, the Tribe cannot exercise jurisdiction in derogation of 
the State in this case. 
8
 The Reber decision has created an untenable 
jurisdictional gap. Under Reber, illegal non-Indian hunting 
committed on non-Indian land within Indian Country is no longer 
subject to state regulatory authority or criminal jurisdiction. 
In practice, the State can no longer enforce non-Indian hunting 
violations in state court, as it has traditionally done, even on 
land that the State owns. Moreover, the Ute Tribe cannot 
prosecute non-Indians criminally, see Oliphant v. Suquamish 
Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978), or civilly for violations on 
non-Indian land, see Montana, supra. Finally, because the 
illegal hunting occurred outside of trust land, the federal 
courts cannot assert authority under the federal trespass 
statute. See 18 U.S.C. §1165 (forbidding trespass on trust land 
only). 
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Reber violates the teaching of the United States Supreme 
Court in Montana and creates confusion that will only result in 
further litigation by treating Indian Country as if it were 
synonymous with trust lands, Ute V offers nothing to ameliorate 
this result. The decision should be reversed. 
POINT TWO 
THE UINTAH BAND HAS NO INDEPENDENT 
EXISTENCE THAT GIVES DEFENDANT, A 
PURPORTED MEMBER, AN INDEPENDENT 
RIGHT TO HUNT OR FISH IN INDIAN 
COUNTRY FREE OF STATE OR UTE TRIBAL 
REGULATION 
Defendant's claimed affiliation with the Uintah band gives 
him no independent treaty right to hunt or fish in Indian Country 
free of state or Ute tribal regulation. Defendant argues to the 
contrary by first endorsing the court of appeals' conclusion that 
the State lacks jurisdiction over him for hunting in Indian 
Country without a permit. He then further asserts that the Ute 
Indian Tribe also lacks jurisdiction. See Br. of Resp. at 15. 
In essence, he seeks the unfettered right to hunt and fish in 
Indian Country based solely on his purported status as a "Uintah 
band" Indian. 
At the outset, defendant's claims as an Indian have shifted 
throughout this litigation. He initially asserted that he was "a 
member of the Timpanogos Tribe[,] . . . a sovereign tribe whose 
existence pre-dates that of the United States (R. 35). Months 
later, in another memorandum, defendant fashioned himself a 
"Shoshone Indian[] of Utah Territory," disavowing his claim of 
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membership in the Timpanogos Tribe (R. 128). In yet another 
memorandum, defendant called himself a Uintah Band member of the 
Shoshone Indians of Utah Territory (R. 166-68). See also R. 364. 
While defendant asserts membership in these various entities, he 
has not adduced proof either that these groups are, indeed, 
tribal entities or that he is an enrolled member of any of them. 
As to his current claimed affiliation as a Uintah Band 
member, defendant asserts that the Ute Indian Tribe has no 
jurisdiction over him because the Uintah band was "expelled" from 
the Ute Indian Tribe by the Ute Partition Act. Br. of Resp. at 
15-16. This two-page argument, which he raised in a cross-
petition for certiorari, is inadequately briefed. Pursuant to 
rule 24(a)(9), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, a reviewing 
court is "entitled to have the issues clearly defined with 
pertinent authority cited," and is not "simply a depository in 
which the appealing party may dump the burden of argument and 
research." Monson v. Carver, 928 P.2d 1017, 1024 (Utah 
1996)(additional quotation and citations omitted). "[R]ule 
24(a)(9) requires not just bald citation to authority but 
development of that authority and reasoned analysis based on that 
authority." State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299, 305 (Utah 1998). 
Here, while defendant baldly asserts that the Ute Partition 
Act "expelled" the Uintah band from the Ute Tribe, he neither 
quotes from the Ute Partition Act nor otherwise explains what 
language in the Act compels his conclusion. Indeed, he wholly 
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fails to apply what he alleges is dispositive law to the facts of 
his case. When a party does not offer any meaningful analysis 
to support a claim, a reviewing court should decline to reach the 
merits. See, e.g. , State v. Gomez, 2002 UT 120, 529, 63 P. 3d 72 
(declining to address inadequately briefed issues where there was 
no analysis except conclusory statements that appellant was 
entitled to relief); State v. Gamblin, 2000 UT 44, 57, 1 P.3d 
1108 (declining to consider issue in which appellant offered only 
a few sentences and a broad conclusion that he was entitled to 
relief). As this Court has stated, "We will not make or develop 
[defendant]'s arguments for him." Gomez, 2002 UT 120 at 520. 
Even on the merits, defendant's claim fails because the 
status of the Uintah band in relation to the Ute Indian Tribe 
presents a question of federal law that the federal courts have 
clearly settled. The Tenth Circuit, deciding a claim identical 
to defendant's here, has squarely held that Uintah band members 
possess no right to hunt and fish independent of the Ute Indian 
Tribe: 
The [Ute Indian Tribe] Constitution thus 
makes clear that the Bands ceased to exist 
separately outside the Ute Tribe, that 
jurisdiction over what was formerly the 
territory of the Uintah Band was to be 
exercised by the Ute Tribe, and that the 
rights formerly vested in the Uintah Band 
were to be defined by the Ute Constitution 
and exercised by the Ute Tribe. In light of 
these provisions, [defendant] ' s argument that 
the Uintah Band's hunting and fishing rights 
retain a separate existence and belong only 
to the Uintah Band is groundless. 
-13-
United States v. Von Murdock, 132 F.3d 534, 541 (10th Cir. 1997), 
cert, denied, Von Murdock v. United States, 525 U.S. 810 (1998). 
Without offering a cogent legal rationale for departing from this 
settled law, defendant seeks to relitigate in state court what 
the federal court has already decided and to evade federal 
caselaw that is directly on point. Defendant's brief is 
inadequate, and his argument is legally unavailing. 
Consequently, this Court should summarily reject his claim. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated, this Court should reverse the court 
of appeals' ruling that the State lacked jurisdiction because the 
Ute Indian Tribe was the victim of defendant's illegal hunting on 
non-Indian land within Indian Country. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this /£ day of November, 2006. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Attorney General 
C.MJL 
JOANNE C. SLOTNIK 
Assistant Attorney General 
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